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1. Introduction
The subjects of this paper are the Kingdom of 
Tonga,1 its Monarchy, its Constitution, its tradition-
al values and political reform. It is now well known 
that the government and Legislative Assembly of 
Tonga (the Assembly) made a momentous decision 
four years ago in 2010, when it amended the Con-
stitution of Tonga (the Constitution) to shift most 
of the executive powers of the state from the Mon-
arch to a Cabinet of elected leaders. For the first 
time in Tonga’s history, the government was then 
elected. Four years later, on 27 November 2014, that 
government was called to account when Tongans 
went to the polls again to elect a second one.
In the course of the reform, the devolution of 
executive powers was incomplete due to the reten-
tion by the Monarch of several specific powers that 
have remained defined in the Constitution ever 
since its promulgation in 1875. Why did this occur? 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the Tongan 
context, particularly such features as Tonga’s histo-
ry, social structure, development of systems of law 
and government, and persisting social values. In 
the course of suggesting answers to the above ques-
tion, the paper will offer an account of the political 
reform process and its outcomes. 
I call the 2010 decision ‘momentous’ because 
Tonga had been led and ruled by a Monarch for 
well over 150 years without the people having any 
say as to who would run the country. The decision 
was also remarkable because it marked a peaceful 
transition of power, entirely in accordance with the 
terms of the nation’s Constitution. 
There had been growing pressure for constitu-
tional reform but, at the end of the day, it seems that 
the willingness of the late King Tupou V to consider 
devolving executive authority upon an elected Cabi-
net has, if anything, increased many people’s feelings 
of respect towards the institution of monarchy.
Tonga’s 1875 Constitution stands out as per-
haps the most unusual in the Pacific islands region2 
for the uninterrupted survival of 19th-century 
institutions, and for a style of monarchy that, from 
time to time, has shown great leadership, has also 
on occasions seemed selfish and eccentrically Brit-
ish, but still retains widespread popular support. 
Two further comparative perspectives lead to 
the stated aim of this paper. First, the experiences 
of Tonga’s monarchy and those of the royal lines of 
England, Europe and Scandinavia may be contrast-
ed. The latter endured protracted and often vio-
lent struggles that characterised gradual progres-
sive reform from absolute ruler to much respected 
figurehead. It would be unrealistic to expect that 
Tonga, having preserved the status and powers 
of its Monarch, would leap 135 years to 2010 and 
immediately strip its all-powerful hau (traditional 
leader) of all political authority. Instead, the objec-
tive of the mainstream Tongan pro-democracy 
reformers was to transform the role and authority 
of the Monarch in such a way as to preserve certain 
elements of his power and influence — to achieve 
a sort of ‘balance’ that would go some way towards 
securing the value of the monarchy to the nation.
Second, during recent times when many British 
Commonwealth states of the Pacific islands region 
have already generally adopted models of govern-
ment like those of the UK, Australia and New 
Zealand — models that vest all political power in 
a Cabinet of elected representatives of the people, 
often called the ‘Westminster model’ — it is notable 
that Tonga has retained its own different constitu-
tional approach or philosophy. In short, Tonga has 
opted for power-sharing in relation 
to both executive authority and the 
electoral and parliamentary systems 
— for the time being, at least — as 
the ‘odd one out’ in the region.
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Why has Tonga decided not to conform to 
decolonising precedent but instead to experiment 
with compromises that ensure its path will continue 
to be unique? What might be some of the conse-
quences?
Tongan opinions are divided on matters of 
reform — at home in Tonga, and abroad in the dias-
pora (where as many Tongans are settled in Austral-
ia, New Zealand and the USA as there are at home). 
Indeed, many Tongans I know and have worked 
with3 see beyond the negative characteristics of a 
powerful Monarch to an ordering of society that 
has not been experienced elsewhere, and should 
be examined more carefully before it is summar-
ily dismissed as unacceptable in the 21st century. 
Opinions vary on what should be changed, and how 
far and fast reform should go. Many, perhaps most, 
believe that the distinctiveness of their political his-
tory and social system justifies a peculiarly Tongan 
path towards a form of democracy appropriate for 
Tonga. On the other hand, stern critics of the ‘tradi-
tionalist’ view argue that loyalty to the past should 
not colour one’s thinking, especially at a time when 
they believe that too little attention seems to have 
been paid by many politicians, and indeed by the 
public generally, to current and future needs and 
particularly to the task of understanding the nature, 
purpose and impact of the reform measures.
Answers to the many queries and criticisms 
may be summed up in two propositions. First, that 
the reform decisions taken by the people of Tonga 
in 2010 are consistent with, and show a desire to 
retain, traditions and values that, although now 
undergoing change and eroded by global and other 
forces, nevertheless have their place in Tonga — for 
the time being. 
Second, that while traditions and values natu-
rally permeate aspects of their lives to varying 
degrees, for very many Tongans their relationships 
between people of differing social rank, class or 
authority are governed by values such as respect for 
and obedience to traditional authority, or those of 
higher rank, and the corresponding value of reci-
procity. Within a political framework constructed 
around such authority, there is a predisposition to 
accept it, so long as the reciprocal obligations of 
leadership are observed.  
These are difficult and sensitive issues, and not 
of the sort that an external observer would nor-
mally attempt to write about. My broad objective 
in this paper is to inform a wider readership of 
the Tongan context of the reform developments — 
drawing on my research and work in Tonga over 
many years.4 
The second of the six sections of this paper 
summarises the 2010 reform outcomes, as an 
introduction to the ‘law and government’ dimen-
sion of this study. The third will offer an account 
of the context within which the reform story may 
be told, including Tongan society itself, its struc-
ture and history, leading to the meeting of the two 
legal cultures, Tongan and British, from which 
amalgamated forms of monarchy, constitutional 
government and social control were derived. The 
contribution of the first King Tupou, the status of 
nobles, and the penetration of centralised law and 
government are key elements of this account. This 
Tongan context ensured the perpetuation of, and at 
times reinforced, notions of chiefly leadership and 
the pre-eminence of the Monarch as determining 
social values.
In the fourth section, the movement for politi-
cal change will be introduced together with the 
structure of the reform process and the outcomes 
from it. Changes to the legislature and Cabinet, 
together with questions concerning how the Mon-
arch might receive advice, will be looked at from 
the point of view of achieving a balance in the rela-
tionship between the Monarch and elected govern-
ment. The fifth section discusses ongoing concerns 
and the sixth concludes the paper.
It is impossible to do justice to this topic in 
a short paper, and reference must be made to 
key supplementary reading and online resources 
detailed in the References at the end of this paper.5 
2. Changes Effected By the Major Reforms
From 1875, the constitutional position was that the 
Monarch was the head of government as well as the 
head of state. Also, the Monarch has always been, 
and still is, of course, the hau, or traditional leader 
of all Tongans, which role is unaffected by current 
reforms. The supreme executive body was the Mon-
arch in the Privy Council of Tonga where the Mon-
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arch received advice and his views prevailed. Mem-
bership of the Privy Council comprised the prime 
minister and such Cabinet ministers as the Monarch 
chose to appoint to take responsibility for the min-
istries, all appointed by the Monarch to hold office 
and sit in the Legislative Assembly at his pleasure 
regardless of the term of the elected members of the 
Assembly (Constitution of Tonga 18756). Usually the 
prime minister was a close relative of the Monarch, 
and most of the ministers were nobles. Those who 
were not, were deemed to have noble status. Also 
Privy Councillors and thus members of the Assem-
bly were the two governors (administrative heads 
of the two island groups of Ha’apai and Vava’u) who 
were appointed by the Monarch with the consent of 
Cabinet and held office at the Monarch’s pleasure.
Laws were initiated by Cabinet and introduced 
into the Legislative Assembly which comprised the 
Privy Councillors (since 1990, 12 to 14 of them) 
joined by nobles’ representatives and people’s rep-
resentatives, an equal number of each, elected 
every three years by the nobles’ and the people’s 
respective electorates. Originally, all 20 nobles sat 
in the House with 20 people’s representatives. With 
additional noble titles granted, the numbers grew 
to 33, but the unwieldy and expensive Assembly 
was reduced in size in 1914 and nobles and people 
were each represented by seven until 1962, when 
the number was increased to nine. The nine nobles’ 
representatives were thus elected by the 30 holders 
of noble titles,7 while the nine people’s representa-
tives were elected by the wider electorate.8 Bills 
passed by the Assembly could not become law until 
the Monarch signed his assent. Prime minister and 
Cabinet were thus beholden to the Monarch for 
their office and status. For their part, the people’s 
representatives had no prospect of participating in 
government. 
Change was initiated in 2004 towards the end of 
the reign of King Tupou IV when it was announced 
that four of the elected representatives would be 
chosen by the Monarch to join Cabinet as ministers 
(on the understanding that they would no longer 
hold seats as elected members of the House).9 Dr 
Feleti Sevele (now Lord Sevele, a Life Peer) entered 
Cabinet by this route, and became the first ‘com-
moner’ prime minister in March 2006.
The practice had always been for matters of 
importance to be investigated by Cabinet which 
would make recommendations or pass resolutions 
for the Monarch’s consideration in Council. On his 
succession to the throne in September 2006, the 
son of Tupou IV, King Tupou V declared he wished 
to see the devolution of his executive powers10 and 
withdrew gradually from active decision-making. 
He did intervene in aspects of the reform, and lived 
to see the new laws set in place, but died in March 
2012. His younger brother, King Tupou VI, as we 
shall see, plays no role in Cabinet decision-making.11
In light of the broad sweep of the history of 
chiefly power in Tonga offered in the next sec-
tion, it will be seen that the promulgation of King 
Tupou I’s Constitution in 1875 must, of course, be 
acknowledged as Tonga’s greatest political reform. 
Nevertheless, the changes passed into law in the 
Legislative Assembly in 2010 constituted the first 
major set of amendments to the structure of that 
Constitution. In this section, the principal constitu-
tional changes will be identified so that the reader 
who proceeds into section 3 will have in mind the 
system of government towards which Tonga’s his-
tory was progressing.
In short, the recommendations of the Consti-
tutional and Electoral Commission (CEC) were 
considered by Cabinet. Those that were approved 
were presented to the Assembly in legislative form, 
passed and assented to by King Tupou V — to 
become Tonga’s political reforms of 2010.
The primary recommendation of the CEC was:
That the King and Privy Council shall no 
longer be part of the Executive Government 
of Tonga and the Executive Government shall 
be the Cabinet answerable to the Legislative 
Assembly (rec. 2).12
Adopting the recommendation, the Sevele Cab-
inet and the Assembly, with the approval of King 
Tupou V, amended the Constitution to provide that 
the ‘Form of Government’ is now a ‘Constitutional 
Monarchy’ [replacing ‘Constitutional Government’] 
‘under His Majesty King George Tupou V and his 
successors’ (Constitution cl.30).13 ‘Cabinet’ replaces 
‘King and Privy Council’. Two concise statements 
make the position plain:
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One:
The Government of this Kingdom is divided 
into three Bodies – 
1st The Cabinet;
2nd The Legislative Assembly;
3rd The Judiciary (cl. 31).
Two: 
The executive authority of the Kingdom shall 
vest in Cabinet, which shall be collectively 
responsible to the Legislative Assembly for the 
executive functions of Government (cl. 51(1)). 
Consequently, the Monarch now appoints as 
prime minister the elected member of the Assem-
bly who is recommended by the Assembly under a 
selection procedure provided in the Constitution, 
and the monarch will appoint as ministers those 
members who are nominated by the prime minister 
(cls 50A and 51). As for the Privy Council, of which 
Cabinet used to be part, it no longer exists in its 
earlier form. It is not represented in the Assembly 
and is now purely an advisory body (cl. 50). 
Despite the seemingly broad provision for the 
Monarch’s relinquishment of his powers in favour 
of Cabinet, a subclause, 51(7), preserves all execu-
tive powers already expressly vested in the Mon-
arch by the Constitution, any Act of the Legislative 
Assembly or royal prerogative. Thus, in order to 
ascertain the precise nature of the ‘balance’ of pow-
ers that has now been struck in the reform pro-
cess — between the Monarch and other sources 
of authority — it is necessary to search for the rel-
evant constitutional clauses and construct a list of 
these further powers of the Monarch. 
One group of the Monarch’s powers concern-
ing: 
Appointment and supervision of the Judiciary 
and office of Attorney-General
Through creation of the positions of Lord 
Chancellor and a Judicial Appointments and 
Discipline Panel, and
Making appointments, etc., after listening to 
advice from the Panel (cls 83B–102)
was proposed by Cabinet and Tupou V contrary to 
the recommendations of the CEC and came into 
force as part of the reform. Their fate at the hands 
of the post-reform Cabinet, Assembly and Monarch 
is uncertain — see section 5. 
The following clauses, which have been 
untouched by the reform, preserve the power, influ-
ence and entitlements of the Monarch in prescribed 
and not insignificant ways. They stand alongside 
the principal political reform, namely the devolu-
tion of executive authority, to create a sharing of 
power, between Monarch and Cabinet. According 
to the records, none of these clauses except for that 
concerning the veto over legislation was discussed 
in the reform process. It is remarkable that neither 
they nor the concept of power-sharing were consid-
ered, as such, by the Commission. The clauses have 
survived from 1875 to 2010, to the same effect, and 
remain today.14
Succession to the throne
The Constitution guarantees perpetual succes-
sion to the lineage of the Monarch. (2010 cl. 32)15
A member of the Royal Family who is likely 
to succeed to the throne may not marry with-
out the King’s consent, and if such marriage 
occurs, the member’s right to succeed may be 
cancelled (2010 cl. 33).
Relationship with Legislative Assembly
The Monarch may convoke and dismiss the 
Legislative Assembly at any time, and may 
call general elections (2010 cls 38 and 77).
As to the law-making process, no law may be 
made by Parliament without his assent (2010 
cls 41, 56).
Defence Forces and martial law
The Monarch commands the Tonga Defence 
Forces, may proclaim martial law and raise 
a militia, but may not make war without the 
consent of the Assembly (2010 cls 36, 46 & 22).
Right to a hearing suspended
The Monarch may suspend Habeas Corpus in 
case war or rebellion (2010 cl. 9).
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International affairs
The Monarch may make treaties with foreign 
states and appoint diplomatic representatives 
(2010 cl. 39).
Hereditary estates
The Monarch alone may grant hereditary 
noble titles and estates and such an estate will 
revert to the Monarch in the absence of an 
heir (2010 cl. 112).
Honours and distinctions
It is the Monarch’s prerogative to give titles of 
honour and confer honourable distinctions 
(2010 cl. 44).
Naturalisation
The Monarch may approve applications to 
become naturalised subjects (2010 cl. 29).
Coinage as legal tender
It is the prerogative of the Monarch, with the 
advice of Cabinet, to decree the coinage to be 
legal tender (2010 cl. 45).
Entrenched protection
The Constitution which protects the Monarch 
cannot be changed without his consent.  
(2010 cl. 79).
There remain longstanding further clauses, 
which originated after 1875, as where:
the Monarch in Council sits in judgment on 
appeals from the Land Court concerning 
hereditary estates and titles (2010 cl. 50(2))
 and
the Monarch in Council may grant a Royal 
Pardon (2010 cl. 37).
To return to the Cabinet, its size is now limited 
to not more than half the number of elected mem-
bers of Parliament (excluding the speaker). This 
means that the prime minister and the 11 minis-
ters nominated by him in the 26-member Legisla-
tive Assembly must seek the support of some MPs 
other than ministers in order to secure passage of 
legislation. Further, the prime minister may aug-
ment the skills and experience levels of his cabinet 
by nominating for appointment as ministers up to 
four appropriate persons from outside the Assem-
bly. This was a contentious reform issue, clouded in 
debate, to which reference will be made later in sec-
tion 4.3 because of the sentiments revealed. 
The ministers are thus elected MPs represent-
ing constituencies (except for up to four, referred 
to above). They are bound by responsibilities under 
both the Constitution and the conventions of Cabi-
net government, as also reviewed in section 4.3.
This devolution of the Monarch’s executive 
authority and the transformation of the Tongan 
Cabinet has put the whole of government leader-
ship onto a regular election cycle for the first time 
— now a four-year term. The November 2010 elec-
tions referred to were the first to be held under a 
new electoral system in which the two electorates 
comprise:
i. the hereditary landholding nobles (33 titles 
held by 30 nobles), plus four law lords and 
nine life peers (honorary nobles), who elect 
nine hereditary nobles as their representa-
tives; and 
ii. the balance of the people who now elect 17 
representatives (Constitution cl. 60).
In the required secret ballot on 21 December 
2010, 14 of the 26 members of the new Assembly 
chose as Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano — an 
experienced parliamentarian.16 Pro-Democracy 
veteran, ‘Akilisi Pohiva, mustered 12 votes. From 
the elected members Tu’ivakano appointed a Cabi-
net of 11 ministers including two nobles and both 
independent and Pro-Democracy people’s repre-
sentatives.17 Permitted to choose up to four minis-
ters from outside the house, he chose two, one of 
whom is a senior woman administrator in educa-
tion, respected academic and intellectual, and the 
other an experienced lawyer and politician.18 Over 
the past three and a half years from 2010, Cabinet 
has not been stable, mainly as a result of ministerial 
reshuffles, resignations and appointments.19 
In short, Tonga is today governed by the elected 
prime minister and ministers, together with the 
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Monarch in the exercise of his listed powers. That is 
the main thrust of the reforms. Executive power is 
now shared. 
Naturally enough, the Tongan system of gov-
ernment has had its critics, before and after reform 
— it is said to be ‘anachronistic’, and at odds with 
current notions of ‘democracy’ and ‘good govern-
ance’. Indeed, in many contexts (including in some 
academic circles, people engaged in private enter-
prise and aid delivery, and in the media), discourse 
around Tonga sometimes seems quite derogatory 
and dismissive. 
Over the years that I have been involved with 
Tonga, I have become aware of these views — and, 
while acknowledging abuses within the system, I 
regard most of the views as exaggerated and ill-
informed. 
The question many outsiders ask is how this state 
of affairs came about and why have Tongans accept-
ed it? The answer lies in Tonga’s past. I will begin 
by identifying from my research those elements of 
Tongan history, traditional organisation and consti-
tutional development that continue to form people’s 
values and thinking, and have thus contributed to 
continuing respect for traditional authority and gen-
eral acceptance of the sharing of power.
3. The Historical and Sociopolitical Context
3.1 Structure of Tongan society20
Settled over 3,000 years ago, Tonga and Samoa are 
at the historical base and traditional heart of the 
growth and spread of Polynesian civilisation. It was 
from these two archipelagos that, about 1,700 years 
ago, the great sailing canoes made their way east to 
the Marquesas and thence to Hawaii, Tuvalu, the 
Cook Islands and New Zealand. Long periods of iso-
lation between groups of islands fostered distinctive 
language and cultural development, resulting today 
in the several Polynesian nation-states and territories
By the 13th century, to quote historian Ian 
Campbell: 
Tongan society had acquired a form easily 
recognisable to later generations. It had a 
centralised system of chieftainship, one chief 
being recognised as superior to and having 
authority over all others, and deriving his 
authority from heaven. He could command 
a large labour force; food production was 
efficient enough to allow large numbers of men 
to engage in warfare, voyaging and building. 
(Campbell 2001, 36) 
Through the 16th and 17th centuries and into 
the 18th, Tongans took warfare to neighbouring 
island groups and built new dynasties at home that 
engaged in violent competition resulting in civil 
war. Tongans became Christians in the 19th cen-
tury, when a single leader emerged to re-introduce 
central control with codes of law aimed at unifying 
the country as a Christian state — under a single 
dynasty.
It is useful at this point to consider the nature 
of the society which produced powerful leadership 
and lived with it for centuries.21 In short, Tonga 
possessed a vigorous traditional organisation of a 
hierarchical nature and extensive kinship groupings 
and allegiances which were conducive to the forma-
tion of broad bases of power. Disruptive warfare 
caused fortified towns to be built and occasion-
ally the severance and re-alignment of ties linking 
groups of people with their leaders and the land. 
Control of land by the large descent groups (called 
ha’a) of a few high-ranking chiefs meant that sub-
division into ever smaller kinship groups (kain-
ga) placed people in a state of perpetual tenancy 
(Powles 1979, 65–68). 
As time has gone on, the complexity of kin-
ship relationships has increased. Perhaps the most 
persistent feature of society is the pervasive rec-
ognition of ‘eiki (the chiefly rank, or higher status, 
of another person).22 Anthropologist Kerry James 
observes: 
The strength of the social system lies less 
strictly in the imposition of chiefly values 
than in their dissemination throughout socie-
ty so that each segment of kin and household 
organisation essentially replicates the internal 
organisation of aristocratic structures of kin-
dred. What appear to have been solely ‘eiki 
customs of kinship rank are now followed by 
an emancipated population and have come to 
represent Tongan culture and tradition (James 
1997, 50). 
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3.2 The reforms of Tupou I and his constitution- 
        making
Historians are agreed that the first King of Tonga 
was a man of remarkable intellect and vision. 
Taufa’ahau, as the inheritor of a regional chiefdom, 
established his claim to the title Tu’i Kanokupolu 
in the then most powerful Tongan lineage. By 
1845 he had unified Tonga under his leadership 
as King George Taufa’ahau Tupou I. He believed 
it was necessary to gain the early international 
recognition of his sovereignty in the form of treaties 
with France, Germany, Great Britain and the USA, 
thereby forestalling any attempt to claim Tonga 
as a colony. A major underlying purpose of the 
Constitution of Tonga of 1875 was to demonstrate 
to the world that Tonga possessed the institutions 
of government and political stability necessary to 
govern itself in acceptable fashion without outside 
interference. 
A critical step was to relegate all rival chiefs 
to a status subordinate to that of the Monarch, 
who would hold sole power to confer and remove 
hereditary titles. Thus the Constitution entrenched 
the status of 20 of them as hereditary nobles to 
control parliament and, together with a further six 
hereditary estate-holding chiefs, to control most of 
the land. 
Tupou I was also driven by the desire to see 
estate land distributed amongst the people and 
made productive. Succession to hereditary titles 
and estates was determined by the Constitution, 
and associated land legislation provided for both 
security for the estate-holder and his obligation 
to distribute allotments of land to be claimed by 
young males and held as hereditary life interests. 
Tongan society was thus to be divided in two 
dimensions. Three classes of citizens were officially 
created and entrenched in law for governmental 
and land-owning purposes. They were the ‘Mon-
arch and heirs to the throne’, the ‘nobles’ and the 
‘commoners’. The horizontal lines of stratification 
separating these classes were however, crossed and 
sometimes obliterated by the vertical criss-crossing 
of kinship ties, links between hereditary groups of 
higher and lower status and the ranking of each 
person and family vis-à-vis the other in accordance 
with kinship rules (Powles 1979, 59–62).
Looking back, it can be seen that the Constitu-
tion was the culmination of decades of effort on 
Tupou’s part to use the laws of a central authority 
as the means of establishing and maintaining gov-
ernment and implementing policies.23 He began in 
1839 with a code of laws, mainly to prohibit com-
mon crimes and enforce biblical teachings, and 
significantly to declare the law as the only source 
of authority. Chiefs were subject to it, and judges 
were appointed to decide guilt and punishment, 
traditional powers thus taken from chiefs. Follow-
ing extensive consultations with the chiefs, with 
George Grey (then Governor of New Zealand) and 
with missionaries, Tupou promulgated a replace-
ment code in 1850 that went further to control the 
power of chiefs, prohibit the alienation of land and 
assert his absolute authority. Due to this provo-
cation of certain chiefs, and with undertones of 
French interference, civil war broke out in 1852 
but was short-lived. That year Tupou travelled to 
Sydney and observed how government there was 
administered (Latukefu 1975, ch. III). 
The third code, of 1862, took large strides 
towards a charter of government, providing for 
justice and education, and spelling out the King’s 
powers. Known as the ‘emancipation edict’, the code 
abolished the authority of chiefs over their people 
and absolute rights of chiefs over their land. The 
notion was introduced that chiefs would allocate 
land according to need and could not interfere with 
a man’s holding as long as he paid tax and rent — 
as fixed by law. Tupou’s strategy was that the entire 
population would owe loyalty to him rather than 
to the chiefs, thus freeing him from dependence on 
the goodwill of the chiefs (Latukefu 1975, 33–40).
The story of the drafting, granting and imple-
mentation of the 1875 Constitution includes refer-
ence to advice given by missionary Shirley Baker 
and revisions of wording, rather than meaning, by 
British envoy, Basil Thomson (Latukefu 1975, chs 
4 and 5). However, Tupou I was determined to give 
the Tongan people a blueprint for a modern nation 
sustained by benign central authority based on 
principles of chiefly leadership. 
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3.3 Pre-eminence of the Monarch as a constitu- 
       tional value
The Constitution of Tonga has always incorporated 
certain cultural principles. Indeed, it can be said 
that every written constitution is imbued with a 
discernible ‘philosophy’ (Powles 2007b, 28–32). 
The pre-eminence of the Monarch, the status of 
nobles and the existence of a commoner class 
reflected aspects of traditional cultural Tongan 
thinking about chiefly leadership, as articulated by 
Tupou I, and also drew on British notions of nobil-
ity of the time. By virtue of privileges accorded 
to Monarch and nobles in the parliamentary pro-
cess, law-making was within their control. From a 
journalistic self-styled lawyer he had met in Syd-
ney, Tupou I found that this Tongan approach to 
ultimate authority was well expressed in Hawai‘i 
under the leadership of King Kamehameha III in 
his constitution of 1852,24 and he adopted clauses 
from that source (Latukefu 1975, 30). Comparisons 
of relevant articles from the Constitution of Hawaii 
1852 with clauses from the subsequent Constitution 
of Tonga 1875, and the 1988 reprint with today’s 
Tongan Constitution demonstrate how concepts 
and the ways of expressing them have time-travelled 
unchanged from 1852 to 2010 (Powles 2007b, 36–38). 
A review of the Constitution as it emerged from 
the amendment process in 2010 (see consolidation 
in Powles 2013, Appendix, 88–102), reveals that: 
The original structure and language style, as 
well the precise subject matter, of the 1875 
document, have been preserved.
Two-thirds (79) of the clauses of the consoli-
dation were untouched by the reform process. 
Much as before, the consolidation reflects the 
focus on the monarchy (55 of the 115 clauses 
refer to ‘the King’ in one context or another). 
Thus, much of the Constitution today is the 
same in its application to King Tupou VI and his 
late brother Tupou V as it was when it applied to 
the brothers’ great-great-great-great-grandfather 
over a century ago.25
All in all, the Tongan Constitution, having been 
created in order to establish and entrench the mon-
archy as the means by which the new state would 
prosper, still appears to reflect that institution as 
foundational. If the reformed Constitution has a 
discernible underlying philosophy in the present 
century, it is perhaps that, for the time being, the 
interests of the Tongan people are best served by 
retention of a monarchy that demonstrates leader-
ship and retains the means to protect those public 
interests, until further reform may be considered.
Inevitably, inconsistencies and ambiguities have 
arisen from retention of royal powers outside the 
ambit of the principle of devolution of executive 
authority — to be considered further in section 4.4 
and 4.5. 
3.4 Nobles and lesser chiefs 
Traditional Tongan values associated with the 
authority of chiefs were incorporated in the Con-
stitution thus reinforcing the power and influence 
of the chiefs selected as nobles, particularly in rela-
tion to their privileged position in the legislature 
and in relation to land (Marcus 1980, 76–79).26 On 
the other hand, important values that commonly 
would accompany the status of chiefs and the exer-
cise of chiefly authority have received no formal 
recognition. These values are concerned with reci-
procity of obligation, service to the kinship group 
and kinship loyalty. 
Nobles found that they could, if they wished, 
rely on their constitutional status and statutory 
powers under the land tenure system in order to 
secure compliance from their people. For some 
nobles it became easy not to assume traditional 
responsibility for them, and not to relate in a fully 
reciprocal manner. Other nobles, of course, have 
managed much better. 
As for the dozens of lesser chiefs and heads of 
family descent groups throughout Tongan society, 
traditional values around chiefship, kinship and 
family status have always flourished, unhindered 
by the formal law. Respect and obedience were and 
are still nourished as appropriate behaviour (James 
1997, 50).  
3.5 Amalgam of legal cultures and spread of  
       centralised law
Discussion to this point has focused on the Ton-
gan chiefly system, and the British contribution 
must now be considered. When two social systems 
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came into contact, as did the British and Tongan 
systems last century, two legal cultures interacted. 
As a homogeneous society like that of Tonga had 
need of only one legal culture, it was natural that, 
over time, some sort of amalgam of the two original 
components would result. The introduction of Brit-
ish concepts was accompanied by some controversy 
and conflict, but the architects of the new state of 
Tonga selected elements from each legal culture and 
arrived at an early accommodation of the two. In 
this way, Tonga was able to lead Pacific island soci-
eties in establishing stable central government. 
The distinctiveness of the Tongan experience 
over the past 150 years derives essentially from the 
ordering of Tongan society — as seen in the forma-
tion and preservation of key institutions. The order-
ing of society during this period originally involved 
the adoption and application of compatible concepts 
selected from two legal cultures. A combination 
evolved of: a) the authoritative elements of Tongan 
chiefly law, and b) the command theory of English 
jurisprudence, which, with the Christian notion 
of individual responsibility, characterised the Brit-
ish legal system. Thus, respect for authority was 
instilled from these persisting sources.
During the period 1850–1950, which was 
crucial for the establishment of national govern-
ment and international independence, the essen-
tial requirement was a central foundation for the 
growth of the legal system. While law-making 
acknowledged the Constitution as the source of its 
legitimacy, the massive code, The Laws of Tonga 
1891 (becoming the 1903 code), provided that cen-
tral legal foundation for modern Tonga. The period 
1920–40 was characterised by interference by Brit-
ish officials and the penetration of English govern-
mental practices. Courts under British and New 
Zealand judges together with local magistrates were 
engaged in implementing law and securing compli-
ance (Powles 1990, 162). 
As the code appeared to indicate an intention to 
legislate for Tonga in the manner of a larger metro-
politan country,27 it seemed important that research 
should ascertain as far as possible the extent to 
which the laws of the state in fact regulated the lives 
of ordinary Tongans. The large volume of informa-
tion recorded on the subject28 enabled a remarkable 
picture to be assembled (Powles 1990, 162–69), and 
only a brief summary can be provided here. First to 
note is the extensive range of matters dealt with by 
law: from the collection of taxes and fees on land, 
animals and the licensing of activities, to requir-
ing public standards of personal cleanliness, build-
ings and road repairs, school attendance and more. 
Every Tongan was brought into a direct relationship 
with their government. (Powles 1990, 162–63)  
The law was disseminated and enforced by dis-
trict and town officers (mayors) responsible for 
promulgating the law at regular fono (meeting), 
which took the place of written law.29 The Governor 
would summons a ‘great fono’, and the local noble 
— a ‘noble’s fono’. Attendance has been compulsory 
since 1924. (Powles 1990, 163–64)
The sheer volume of court activity in the small 
kingdom leads to the conclusion that police and 
other government officials intruded into the lives of 
all adult Tongans and left a deep impression of the 
power of central government. Some dramatic statis-
tics were achieved in the first thirty years last cen-
tury, and surprisingly early in the century having 
regard to the short history of government.30 
The high conviction and low appeal rates indi-
cate that it was the direct and energetic imple-
mentation of an extraordinarily comprehensive 
and penetrating system of laws which produced 
the statistics. Certainly, such implementation was 
a burden for a large proportion of the population, 
who were imprisoned for failure to pay fines31 and 
could lose their allotments for failure to pay rent. 
Punishment by whipping played its part. However, 
the ‘outcome’ statistics were reduced by the fact 
that both the criminal and the civil consequences 
of a ‘wrongful’ act were often dealt with at the same 
time under longstanding and sensible provisions 
aimed at permitting the court to compensate the 
‘victim’. (Powles 1990, 166)    
The early hierarchy of courts was operated with 
enthusiasm. Since 1914,32 Tonga has had a body of 
registered advocates, with more experience than 
training, who have acted in cases of all types and 
have been instrumental in further increasing the 
force of written law as a means of modifying atti-
tudes and behaviour. They have encouraged the 
idea of the authority of the law as the ultimate sanc-
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tion, and its machinery as the forum for dispute 
settlement and the manipulation of interests. 
To sum up, communication between govern-
ment and the governed was one way — of the ‘top-
down’ variety — perpetuating notions of respect for 
and compliance with the requirements of those in 
authority. There is no parallel for this early admin-
istration of formal law elsewhere in the Pacific. 
4. Reform: Process and Outcome
4.1 Pro-democracy movement and input to the  
       reform process 
The drive to reduce the executive power of the 
Monarch and introduce a more representative gov-
ernment evolved from longstanding concerns that 
the government of Tonga was typically incompetent 
and failed to account for its laxity in money mat-
ters. These concerns and the rise and many trans-
formations of the pro-democracy movement have 
been chronicled by Ian Campbell (2005, 2006, 2011 
and 2012). A ‘time-line’ of relevant events from 
1992 to 2007, including public service strikes, pub-
lic demonstrations and the Nuku’alofa riot, may be 
found in Powles 2007a, 130–41.
Discontent had begun to be articulated in the 
late 1970s, and when, in 1984, a teacher and radio 
broadcaster called ‘Akilisi Pohiva was sacked for 
conducting current affairs radio programs that 
criticised the government, his employer, his suc-
cessful action in a Supreme Court decision given 
in May 1988 demonstrated that he had found a 
useful forum for drawing attention to future con-
tests with the authorities. In the meantime, he was 
elected to parliament and became established as 
most prominent of those members who wanted to 
attack the government and demand accountability 
at every opportunity. Attempts to form opposi-
tion parties waxed and waned in a fluid setting 
with shifting associations. Between 1998 and 2004 
the pro-democracy movement put forward sev-
eral proposals for specific change to the Constitu-
tion, but none were accepted by government. As 
recounted in section 2, a commoner was appointed 
prime minister in 2006, leading to a crucial period 
of co-operation between Prime Minister Sevele and 
King Tupou V. 
The part played by ‘Akilisi Pohiva and the pro-
democracy people’s representatives leading up to 
and during the reform process had the effect of 
keeping pressure on that process. Campbell has 
spoken of the strengths and limitations of their 
contributions to it: 
No one was so abrasive or persistent as Pohi-
va; no one had his vote-pulling power. Suc-
cessive politicians entered parliament on his 
electoral ‘coat tails and lost when he broke 
with them ... Although the people’s repre-
sentatives were never unified, and Pohiva was 
never an organisational or parliamentary fac-
tion leader, his hectoring of government pro-
vided a lead that others were pleased and able 
to follow. (Campbell 2011, 228–29)
During the reform process itself, the pro-
democracy parliamentary candidates and repre-
sentatives were unable to make many strategic and 
effective contributions on reform issues. Indeed, 
it was a feature of the reform process that PM and 
Cabinet, with the King’s backing, exercised control 
in a manner that defeated opposition attempts to 
influence the outcome in a significant way. 
Five principle sources and forums contributed 
to the making of the ultimate reforms: 
i.   The National Committee for Political Reform 
(NCPR) — comprising nine members, mainly of 
the Assembly, together with experienced outsid-
ers — was appointed in 2005 by the Assembly 
to consult widely and record public opinion on 
people’s attitudes and priorities towards change. 
The NCPR held public consultations at home 
and abroad, and reported to the King, then to 
the Assembly in October 2006.33 It was impor-
tant that the people were consulted but, because 
its agenda was unstructured, the NCPR’s recom-
mendations lacked necessary specificity.
ii.  The Assembly’s Tripartite Committee for Politi-
cal Reform was appointed by government to 
guide parliamentary discussion forward.
iii. The CEC, comprising four Tongans (two of 
whom had been members of the NCPR) from 
different fields — a senior woman administrator 
in education, a legal practitioner, an experienced 
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academic and secretary of the Traditions Com-
mittee — was chaired by a British judge who had 
served in Tonga and elsewhere in the Pacific. The 
CEC was appointed under an Act of Parliament 
with clearly defined terms of reference and to 
report by November 2009 — during which time 
it conducted hearings in Tonga and overseas, 
and published an interim report that attracted 
discussion.34 
iv.  The Cabinet (expressing the views of King 
Tupou V, Prime Minister Sevele and ministers).
v.   The Assembly itself, where the Privy Council 
(comprising the prime minister and ministers 
of Cabinet plus the governors) with further 
noble support if necessary, had a clear major-
ity of numbers. Of the 82 recommendations 
of the CEC considered by the Assembly 15–17 
December 2009, 30 were rejected or modified in 
some way. The outcome of the Assembly’s delib-
erations was presented back to the Assembly 
between May and September 2010 in the form 
of Bills to amend the Constitution and related 
statutes.35 
A general election for the Assembly was due in 
November 2010, and the Sevele government had 
declared itself committed to having the reform laws 
decided, passed and in place by then. It is under-
standable that such a timeframe had to be imposed, 
but the consequences were unfortunate in that 
opportunities were limited for adequate considera-
tion of recommendations and Bills. Through pub-
lication of its interim report, the CEC was able to 
draw more people in to consider and debate differ-
ing views around the reform proposals. The CEC 
repeatedly pointed out that the whole reform pro-
cess needed more time (paras 39 and 65).
4.2 The Legislature
As already indicated, much of the Constitution 
remained unchanged by the 2010 reforms. Of 
course, the Monarch is no longer involved in ini-
tiating legislation, but he retains his power of veto, 
through which he can exert influence on law-
making, if he chooses. The Monarch retains the 
right to summons and dismiss Parliament — pow-
ers reserved in practice for emergencies. It was 
noted in 1990 that Tonga’s Monarch is the only 
head of state in the Pacific who has absolute veto 
power, and is also alone in his power of dismissal 
(Ghai and Cottrell 1990, 145, 162), and this has not 
changed. 
As to the representatives (reps) in the Parlia-
ment, it had always been the case that the num-
ber of people’s reps would equal the number of 
nobles (or, since 1914, the number of nobles’ reps). 
This disproportionate arrangement has now been 
reviewed for the first time. Issues considered by the 
Commission included whether the nobles should 
have any allocated seats in Parliament at all, and 
if they had such seats, whether the nobles’ reps 
should be elected by the nobles alone or by the 
wider electorate.
The idea of retaining nine nobles’ reps but at 
the same time increasing the number of peoples’ 
reps from nine to 17 had been recommended with-
out explanation in the NCPR’s report of August 
2006, and it seems no subsequent opinions weighed 
heavily against it. That numbering now appears 
in the Constitution (cl. 60). There was however a 
major conflict of views put to the CEC on the prin-
cipal issue. In concluding that discussion, the CEC 
made several observations. It said:
The presence of the Nobles in the Assembly 
has long been accepted and is still regarded by 
a substantial number of members of the pub-
lic as essential when considered against the 
traditional structure of Tongan society and 
the importance of the ties of kainga and ha’a 
(family and dynasty) (para. 320).
and concluded:
The decision to retain them will be seen by 
many outside our borders as a failure to grasp 
a chance to achieve democracy. We define 
democracy by more than the right to elect a 
representative parliament. Much that truly 
defines democracy is already enshrined in 
traditional Tongan values … at this stage,  
we feel the continued presence of the Nobles 
in the new and untried representative par-
liament will be accepted by most Tongans 
as a sensible and, possibly, necessary influ-
ence. Having said that, we feel compelled to 
note that the apparently casually prepared 
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and inadequate submissions, initially by 
the Nobles’ representatives and later by the 
Nobles as a whole, leaves us little ground for 
such a hope (para. 323).
Indeed, the nobles’ reps had opposed the crea-
tion of the CEC and abstained from voting on the 
Bill which set it up. 
The main reform affecting the Assembly is 
the transformation of its responsibility. Instead of 
being divided between a) members from outside as 
ministers loyal to the King, and b) members owing 
allegiance to their constituency of voters, the whole 
elected membership of 26 is now responsible to its 
respective electorates for finding, within its num-
bers, appropriately experienced and ethical lead-
ers to be the prime minister and the ministers. Of 
course, by the same token, it is the responsibility of 
the two electorates to elect Assembly members suit-
ably qualified for leadership.
4.3 The transformation of Cabinet itself
As government of the nation is managed day by day, 
the PM and ministers in Cabinet are the centre of 
attention. A contentious issue was whether the PM 
should be able to increase the skills and experience 
levels of his Cabinet by appointing up to four 
appropriate persons from outside the Assembly. 
In the past, successive Monarchs had done so. 
Differences of opinion became apparent during the 
reform process, reflecting views from ‘The King 
should be able to appoint them, in order to maintain 
a bond between the King, the Nobles and the People’ 
(Tripartite Committee, recorded in CEC para. 
148), to rejection of the idea of such appointments 
(whether by King or PM) on the part of the CEC 
members, who considered that leadership qualities 
were more important for a Cabinet minister than 
technical expertise, and further that the strength of 
the monarchy was not diminished by the complete 
withdrawal of the monarchy from government of 
the country (paras 149–50). 
Turning to Cabinet as a whole, it is fundamental 
to the success of Cabinet government in Tonga that 
all Cabinet members accept that they are bound by 
the conventions of Cabinet government as practiced 
in countries that follow the British-derived Cabinet-
based system, several of which are still, of course, 
constitutional monarchies. Thus, Cabinet is now 
‘collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly’ 
from which (except for up to four) they were cho-
sen in order to carry out ‘the executive functions 
of the Government’ (cl. 51). What was once a long-
standing convention is now required by the Consti-
tution. Undoubtedly, the focus will now be on the 
conduct of ministers, not only in the administration 
of their portfolios, but also in their acknowledg-
ment of the prime minister as their leader (no need 
to look over one’s shoulder to see what the Monarch 
might be thinking), their acceptance of Cabinet 
confidentiality and their preparedness to promote 
and defend all Cabinet decisions.
4.4 ‘The King in Council’
One of the puzzling outcomes of the reform pro-
cess was the Sevele government’s refusal to adopt 
the CEC’s recommendations regarding providing 
advice for the Monarch. When he sat with a Privy 
Council of his ministers, pre-reform, the Monarch 
would rely on them for advice, and the ‘King in 
Council’ was the highest executive authority in the 
land. The Privy Council now comprises only those 
‘people whom the King shall see fit to call to his 
Council’ (cl. 50) — and he may choose none, if he 
thinks he doesn’t need advice.
The CEC was aware of the relationship applica-
ble between non-executive monarchs and cabinet 
governments found in the UK and Commonwealth. 
The words of an early British constitutional com-
mentator come to mind: ‘To state the matter short-
ly, the sovereign has, under a constitutional mon-
archy such as ours, three rights — the right to be 
consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn’ 
(Bagehot 1867, 130). These valuable functions can 
only be carried out effectively if the monarch has 
competent advice.36 
Further, given that the Monarch in Tonga 
retains a considerable number of powers, it would 
seem to be in the public interest that he should 
have the best advice available to him. The CEC’s 
recommendations (rejected as indicated above) 
were that, in addition to the King’s own appointees, 
the Council should be a constitutional body with 
a core of 6 ex officio members selected by, for 
example, the Council of Churches, the Traditions 
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Committee, and the governors of the island groups. 
Also, to ensure advice was prepared, the prime 
minister should report to the King once a week, 
and the Council should meet at least once every 
three months (recs 10–16).
I believe no public statement was made on the 
issue, but that the prime ministers and ministers 
may have felt it was inappropriate for the King’s 
discretion in relation to his Council to be dictated 
by the Constitution. As it happened, the late King 
had begun the practice of appointing ‘law lords’ to 
advise him, and uncertainty surrounding this initia-
tive is mentioned in section 5.
4.5 Approaches to ‘finding the balance’
What were the considerations going through the 
minds of those people involved in the reform who 
were aware that an intended outcome of the pro-
cess would be a very significant sharing of executive 
power between the Monarch and elected government?
As discussed above, evidence of respect for 
persisting traditional authority exists in relation 
to the status of the Monarch but also as a wide-
spread social value (James 1997). Before proceed-
ing further, it is relevant to review the opinions 
of respected Tongan writers on the subject. While 
they approach the subject from very different view-
points, there is an underlying consensus. 
An assessment of Tonga’s political scene in light 
of its cultural history was offered 30 years ago by 
well-known teacher and administrator, Emiliana 
Afeaki, who spoke of Tongan acceptance of ‘the 
values attached to the roles and norms of each 
of the three classes’. She observed ‘Tongans are 
proud of their country and of its monarchy which 
is indeed the stabilising factor of the society’ and, 
without qualifying that statement, went on to add 
that government would be wise ‘if it revolutional-
ises itself from within to suit a changing society’ 
(1983, 58, 77–78).
The late Professor Futa Helu referred, in typi-
cally stern fashion, to Tonga’s culture as a ‘morality 
that is characteristic of rigidly hierarchical socie-
ties’ and observes that ‘the values of such morali-
ties would include loyalty, submission, obedience 
and humility’ (1992, 144). Veteran lawyer, Laki 
Niu, identified ‘total and unquestioning obedience 
or faka’apa’apa’ (respect for higher rank) as ‘the 
essence of this social order’, and referred also to the 
importance of the roles of lesser chiefs. He warned 
of the gradual breakdown of such respect in recent 
times (1992, 308–309). The late Professor Epeli 
Hau’ofa pointed out that, while the Constitution 
‘sowed the seeds for the decline of the aristocracy, 
the ascendancy of the commoner class and through 
this the need for constitutional reform today’, nev-
ertheless there was and still is a crucial role for the 
aristocracy, by which he appeared to mean the royal 
and noble lineages. He added that they are ‘the foci 
of our culture and our identity as a Tongan people, 
as well as being the signposts of our historical con-
tinuity as a nation’ (Hau’ofa 1992).
By the time it was necessary to reach decisions 
on reform proposals, Tongans had been reminded 
of the three classes — the Royalty, the Nobles and 
the Commoners — as a fundamental structure seen 
from time to time in published speeches, reports 
and papers. At important public meetings, the 
three classes are sometimes called the ‘three pillars 
of society’, the ‘three tables’, or, as was said in the 
report of the NCPR — ‘the framework for proceed-
ing with reform relied on “a House of the King, 
Nobles and the People of Tonga based on Unity” ’.37 
Returning to the reform process itself, it is 
noted that, to the extent that there was an agenda 
for reform, it was set by the Act establishing the 
CEC. Nevertheless, Cabinet sought to interpose its 
own priorities from time to time, and again at the 
point of final discussion by the Assembly, by which 
time the CEC was no longer functioning. As far as 
the primary question of the monarch’s executive 
authority was concerned, the CEC and Cabinet 
together approved of the concept of the devolution 
of that authority as a fundamental reform in 
the hierarchy of government and the necessary 
constitutional amendments passed through the 
Assembly accordingly. However, as far as I am 
aware, no mention was made in the CEC’s public 
discussions or report or during Assembly sessions, 
of the Monarch’s express powers as found elsewhere 
in the Constitution. The following observations may 
help to explain, rather speculatively, what occurred.
In the schedule to the CEC Act 2008 that set 
out the matters to be reported on by the CEC, there 
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were two mentions of the Monarch under ‘The 
Executive’, as follows: 
• The roles, functions, powers, duties of, and 
relationships between, the Monarch, the 
Privy Council, Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
• Delegation of certain authority by the King 
to the Prime Minister.
Although it was assumed by some people 
familiar with them (including this author) that 
the terms of reference of the Commission covered 
the Monarch’s express powers (those powers 
being some of the ‘roles, functions, powers’ of 
the Monarch included in the Schedule), the Final 
Report of the CEC expressed the opposite opinion 
(para. 91). However, the prime minister and 
Cabinet had made a detailed submission to the 
CEC early in 2010 (which was referred to in the 
CEC’s report but not published) and there is every 
likelihood that the notion that these express powers 
of the Monarch should not be interfered with 
emanated from that source. 
For his part, in February 2009, Prime Minister 
Sevele was reported as saying in a radio interview 
that it was too early to dismiss the Monarch from 
government and that the brakes should be put on 
‘the call to take away executive power’.38 Indeed, a 
story had been told by Sevele himself in a published 
paper about how, in the mid-1980s he was lectured 
by two aid representatives — from Australia and 
New Zealand — 
to the effect that the major shortcomings 
of Tonga and the cause of it economic ills 
were the monarchy and nobility systems, the 
extended family and the building of elaborate 
churches. I replied: anyone with a little appre-
ciation of the Tongan way of life would realise 
that to do away with these things would be 
tantamount to stripping off some of the most 
fundamental and stabilising elements of Ton-
gan society (1987, 74). 
Indeed, the Sevele Cabinet had no desire to 
strip the Monarch of all powers in government 
matters. The principle of the devolution of the 
Monarch’s executive authority upon Cabinet was 
not going to be absolute and exclusive. 
What conclusions might be drawn from the 
apparent absence of public discussion about the 
retention by the Monarch of the named powers? 
Generally speaking, it would seem more 
respectful to leave it to the Monarch to decide 
whether to act in his own discretion or on the rec-
ommendation of the prime minister. Perhaps it was 
hoped that, despite the absence of any precedent for 
constitutional conventions in Tonga, such a conven-
tion might be developed by the Monarch, of his own 
volition, whereby he would always follow the advice 
of the prime minister in defined circumstances. 
Consequently, the Constitution that emerged 
from the amending process preserved some of the 
King’s authority in government — as many of the 
Tongan leaders during the reform process hoped 
that it would.
This outcome, I suggest, reflects adherence 
by the leaders to the established Tongan values of 
respect for and deference to their Monarch and 
traditional hau. These values have been adhered to 
both through the process of reform and in the sub-
stance of the reform achieved. To a degree, com-
mon sense and pragmatism played their part, as it 
was clearly easier to allocate the respective powers 
of Monarch and Cabinet in accordance with the 
ways in which the relevant clauses of the Constitu-
tion already separated them.
5. Further Considerations
In July 2008, the late King Tupou V caused con-
sternation in legal circles when he announced that 
he would retain what he called his ‘judicial pow-
ers’ — by which he meant executive powers in rela-
tion to the appointment and dismissal of the judges 
(extended later to cover the office of attorney-gen-
eral). As mentioned above, he appointed four ‘law 
lords’ as Privy Councillors to advise him, and ulti-
mately went on to instruct Cabinet to discard the 
existing conventional Judicial Services Commission 
and to provide for new offices, institutions and pro-
cedures which, in his view, were needed to protect 
judicial independence.39 
Legal opinions as to the best way for Tonga to 
proceed in relation to this matter are divided. The 
advice given to the late King Tupou V has appar-
ently been rejected by those now advising Cabi-
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net,40 with the result that legislation for the repeal 
of the relevant reform measures and for the rein-
troduction of the Judicial Services Commission has 
been passed by the Assembly but not yet assented 
to by Tupou VI.41
The timing of events prevented the CEC from 
considering the merits of the issue other than to 
commend the pre-reform government for its adop-
tion of the ‘Judicial Services Commission’ approach. 
However, on the general question of the involve-
ment of the Monarch in decisions affecting the 
direct running of the country, the CEC sounded a 
warning. If a controversy were to arise concerning 
a judge, the Monarch may ultimately be drawn into 
it. At this point it is socially unacceptable to think 
of holding the Monarch publicly accountable. The 
Assembly may demand explanations from Cabi-
net ministers but His Majesty cannot be treated in 
that way. Indeed, it is often said that the Monarch 
should always avoid tasks that are potentially con-
tentious. It is of paramount importance to preserve 
the dignity of his office, remote from the rough-
and-tumble of disputation and strife. The CEC was 
explicit on this point (para. 95).42 
With these considerations in mind, Tonga’s 
leaders may find that the ‘judicial powers’ initiative 
of Tupou V in 2008 will test the ‘balancing of pow-
ers’ concept in the near future.
A further matter that may be raised, perhaps 
as a priority, for the new government elected late 
November 2014 concerns a policy adopted in 2012 
called ‘The ‘Good Governance’ agenda’ under 
which the government introduced and opened for 
public discussion an integrated set of laws directed 
at securing principles of transparency, accountabili-
ty and trust throughout government. The Attorney-
General announced a package of three Bills under 
which there would be an independent body with 
a number of divisions overseen by a Good Gov-
ernance Commission — an anti-corruption divi-
sion, an ombudsman division, and other functions 
that Tonga may want to go ahead with now or in 
the future — for freedom of information, interna-
tional crime, money laundering, etc. These were 
all designed to keep staffing to a minimum within 
Tonga’s budget. The Bills were introduced to the 
Assembly in 2012 and referred to a standing com-
mittee for public consideration.43 Has this initia-
tive stalled? (Powles 2013, 76–77). Is it an example 
of the sort of situation where the influence of the 
Monarch might be enlisted in the new post-reform 
climate? 
As is natural after any major law reform, people 
ask to be given time to become acquainted with it. 
Certainly, as the main structures of reform are in 
place, it may be tempting to many people to leave 
matters as they are, or at least to pause for some 
time, before taking further action. For one thing, 
there is a new King on the throne and many citi-
zens will be waiting to see what his views are and 
what direction he will take on many issues. 
Crises can arise overnight. Perhaps the new 
‘motion of no confidence’ was an example (cl. 50B). 
The story is told of how a motion was presented to 
the Speaker on 18 June 2012, and remained a threat 
to Cabinet for months until it was defeated 13 votes 
to 11 on 3 October that year. There is now a Bill 
to require a two-thirds majority vote in order to 
carry a motion of no confidence, but no action on it 
(Powles 2013, 73–76). Another potential crisis may 
be triggered by threats to abolish the nobles’ elector-
ate and throw open all seats in the Assembly to pop-
ular vote — where nobles would stand as ordinary 
candidates. Such a move could encourage the nobles 
to insist on constitutional privileges that protect 
them — thus testing the Constitution further.
In light of this paper’s focus on the Monarch’s 
relationships with the rest of government, might 
it be possible for aspects of this area of law reform 
to be looked at further, particularly in light of con-
cerns over the quality of advice generally for the 
Monarch? Many countries have law reform com-
missions, made up of part-time appointees to 
reduce cost. In 2007, such a commission was pro-
posed for Tonga and legislation passed and assented 
to. For no publicly stated reason, the Tonga Law 
Commission Act was never brought into force — 
perhaps the idea could be re-examined, along with 
provision for the Monarch to be represented? 
6. Conclusion
The monarchy: This study has reviewed the his-
tory and recent development of the Monarchy as 
the pre-eminent institution within Tongan soci-
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ety and Tonga’s political structure. Constitutional 
change has involved a redefining of the Monarch’s 
role, alongside popular thinking about the symbol-
ism of the balancing of the ‘three pillars’ that sus-
tain Tonga. The most significant shift in Tonga’s 
system of authority has been the devolution of 
executive power from the Monarch to the elected 
representatives of the nobles and the people. How-
ever, as demonstrated in this paper, the devolution 
has not been complete, and it seems that there will 
be ongoing interest in identifying just where power 
and influence lies, and in arguments for and against 
further reform. 
Through examination of Tonga’s political histo-
ry and social setting, this paper has sought to dem-
onstrate that an historical amalgam of penetrating 
systems of traditional authority and introduced law 
has had a tendency to foster attitudes of respect, 
deference and compliance towards those exercis-
ing lawful power. These attitudes are most marked 
where the Monarch is concerned, and it is suggest-
ed that, to a significant extent, they have contrib-
uted to the absence of questioning and debate sur-
rounding the implications of the sharing of execu-
tive powers under a reformed Constitution.
In the immediate future, the leadership quali-
ties of King Tupou VI will be closely observed. 
The Constitution: Tonga’s unique vintage Con-
stitution was flown proudly like a flag on a pole 
from 1875, for the world to see that the people 
of these islands had a set of laws for government 
which rendered the need for colonial interven-
tion unnecessary. There was then a long period 
of settling down, while the two strands of Tongan 
traditional authority and British legal conventions 
amalgamated into the system of government which 
existed, with relatively minor changes, until 2010. 
The magnitude of the 2010 reforms should not 
be underestimated. The reforms that have been 
argued for, and the changes that have actually been 
made, cannot be understood without real familiar-
ity with the amended Constitution, its wording and 
the reasons given for the changes. I have sought to 
encourage such familiarity, and have been fortunate 
to have permission to publish the unofficial con-
solidation of the Constitution as amended (Powles 
2013, appendix). Hopefully, the Constitution will 
be brought down from the flagpole and spread out 
on the table — on tables in offices and schools — 
so that it becomes everyone’s property.
In Tonga, the old adage is borne out — that 
you cannot change peoples’ values and priorities 
with the stroke of a law-maker’s pen. Nonetheless, 
it does seem important that steps are taken to 
introduce practices designed to encourage attitudes 
and behaviours in all branches of government that 
break with traditional notions of relationships 
built on subservience to social rank.44 Apart from 
recognising the position of the Monarch, such 
deference within the system is at odds with the 
demands of government, where transparency and 
accountability are the foundation of fairness and 
the building of trust. If adopted, the proposed 
Good Governance regime of policies and laws 
should encourage improvement of relationships 
between all concerned.
The process of adapting to constitutional 
change is naturally slow. In a message read to the 
Assembly at its closing on 7 June 2013, His Majesty 
Tupou VI observed that Tonga needed more time 
to allow its new democracy to flourish.45 Tonga’s 
second post-reform election in November may test 
new leaders. As Tonga travels down a path that 
encourages greater confidence in their elected rep-
resentatives and ministers, the hopes of the Tongan 
people will surely ride on that journey. 
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1 The Tongan archipelago contains 52 inhabited 
islands, some remote. Seventy-three per cent of the 
population live on the main island of Tongatapu. 
The welfare of the population of 105,300, 37% under 
15, is contributed to by remittances from an equal 
number of Tongans living in New Zealand, Australia 
and the US. Tongans are highly literate in Tongan, the 
language of government and commerce (Small and 
Dixon 2004).
2 The Pacific islands region is home to 14 independent 
and associated states each with its own distinct 
constitution.
3 I carried out doctoral research in Tonga 1974–77 
and have visited on many occasions — for example, 
to gather Tongan contributions for edited books and 
to present papers at conferences. Since 2001, I have 
been engaged from time to time as constitutional 
consultant to the Attorney-General, the government, 
the Constitutional and Electoral Commission and the 
Royal Land Commission. I should add that nothing 
of a confidential nature is revealed here by me, and 
facts recorded are from sources accessible to any 
member of the public who searches for them.
4 See the previous note.
5 One such item is a small book (Powles 2013 which 
this paper aims to complement. The book is more 
comprehensive on the subject of the reforms 
themselves, the rationale for them and how they 
were pursued. Questions discussed, such as those 
surrounding the status and roles of nobles, in politics 
and as hereditary landlords, and factors contributing 
to concerns over the independence of the judiciary 
and the attorney-general, which are merely mentioned 
here, are more fully considered in the book. The 
companion book also contains, as an appendix, the 
Constitution of Tonga as an unofficial consolidation 
of all reform amendments as at 30/11/ 2010. At the 
time of writing, no such consolidation has been 
published in Tonga. 
 Also included in the References are web addresses 
for certain major reports, such as those of the 
Constitutional Commission, as it seems that the 
government has removed these addresses from their 
original locations in Tonga. 
6 See list of References under ‘Government of the 
Kingdom of Tonga’.
7  The number of noble titles was 33 but with multiple 
title-holding by some individuals, the actual number 
voting was 28–30. Independently of the reforms, in 
2008 King Tupou V appointed four Law Lords to 
advise him and in 2010 appointed nine Life Peers, to 
be called ‘Lords’, in recognition of service to Tonga. 
These two types of Lord were given the right to vote 
as nobles in elections, but not to be candidates (Press 
Release, Office of Prime Minister 25/7/ 2008; and 
Matangi Tonga 29/12/2010).
8 The number of non-noble voters registered for the 
election in November 2010 was 42,067 (Matangi 
Tonga 4/11/2010). Adult males have voted since the 
first Assembly under the 1875 Constitution, joined 
by women in 1951. Registration is compulsory but 
voting is not. 
9  Matangi Tonga 11/11/2004.
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10  The late King’s father, King Tupou IV, died on 11 
September 2006. Only a few days later, King Tupou 
V endorsed a dramatic declaration of support for 
the devolution of executive authority (A King Well 
Prepared to Lead, 26/9/2006. Office of the Lord 
Chamberlain, Palace Office, Nuku’alofa). A second 
statement, made by Prime Minister Sevele at the 
King’s request, followed on 19 October 2006 (King 
Voluntarily Cedes Constitutional Authority. Palace 
Office, Nuku’alofa). Incidentally, it should be noted 
that these announcements were made, but not widely 
publicised, before the damaging riot of 16 November 
2006, in Nuku’alofa.
11 King Tupou VI, now 55 years, is well educated (the 
UK; US naval college; University of NSW); and has 
a Bond University MA in International Relations, 
served as prime minister 2000-06, and as Tonga’s 
high commissioner to Australia from 2008 until his 
succession.
12 Unless otherwise indicated, ‘rec.’ will hereafter refer 
to a numbered recommendation of the CEC’s Final 
Report and ‘para’ will refer to a numbered paragraph.
13  ‘cl.’ and ‘cls’ will hereafter refer to the clauses of the 
Constitution of Tonga amended as at 30 Nov 2010 
(for which see the consolidation appended to Powles 
2013).
14 Compare Latukefu, 1975, Appendix A with Powles, 
2013, Appendix.
15 On the death of King Tupou IV, his eldest son 
ascended directly to the throne by virtue of this 
clause. Despite some media conjecture, there was no 
vacancy, hiatus or possible legal intervention. The 
same occurred in March 2012, when Tupou V died 
and his brother took the throne immediately, with the 
coronation to follow some considerable time later.
16 Lord Tu’ivakano is a former speaker of the Assembly 
and minister. He had succeeded to the hereditary 
noble title Tu’ivakano in 1986. He holds an honours 
degree in political science from Flinders University, 
Adelaide. His eldest son is married to the second 
daughter of Princess Pilolevu, the King’s sister (who is 
married to the Noble Lord Tuita).
17 After deliberating for several days, ‘Akilisi Pohiva 
decided not to be a minister.
18  Matangi Tonga 5/1/2011.
19 For example, Pesi Fonua, Challenges for Tonga’s 
More-Democratically-Elected Government in 2014 
Election Year. Matangi Tonga 17/1/2014.
20 This introduction to the background of Tonga’s 
leadership system is offered to those readers in the 
western Pacific and Australia who are less familiar 
with Polynesia.
21 The Polynesian groups of Tonga, Samoa and Hawai‘i 
shared many characteristics, from homogeneity to 
centralised hierarchies and constitution-making that 
incorporated degrees of unchecked monarchical 
power (Ghai 1988, 3–4, 90–92). 
22 The translation of ‘eiki as ‘chief ’ is of little use, as the 
context is needed to determine whether the person 
referred to is an aristocrat from history, a noble, a 
matapule (senior administrative chief) or any relative 
of higher rank (James, 1997, 52). 
23 This account of how the thinking developed around 
‘law-making for a nation’ is drawn from Campbell 
2001, 85–91, and Latukefu 1974, 118–79. The texts of 
the three codes of laws discussed here may be found 
in Latukefu 1974, Appendices A, B and C.
24 The only other constitution in the Pacific to have 
been conferred upon the people by the head of a local 
traditional royal dynasty was that of the Hawai’ian 
Islands when King Kamehameha III consolidated his 
rule with the first Pacific Constitution of 1852. The 
histories of the two countries diverged dramatically 
when the Hawai’ian monarch was overthrown in 
1893, mainly by American ‘business revolutionaries’ 
(Powles 2007b).
25 Tupou II was great-grandson of Tupou I.
26 For a critical assessment of the role of nobles in the 
system of land tenure and administration, see Royal 
Land Commission Final Report online.
27  The population was estimated at 32,000 in the 1930s, 
then exploded to reach 77,500 in 1966 and 97,800 in 
1996 (Small and Dixon 2004). 
28 As part of my doctoral research program, in 1975 
I examined Colonial Office reports, the codes of 
laws, government gazettes and annual reports of the 
Tongan Chief Justices in order to assess the degree of 
implementation and enforcement of these laws. The 
information provided in these paragraphs is drawn 
from the data I obtained. Greater detail and sourcing 
are provided in Powles, 1990. 
29 The Town Regulations Act 1888 defined the fono as ‘a 
meeting at which orders and admonitions are given to 
the people but at which no discussion takes place’.
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30 In 1914, when the population was 23,120, the 
number of criminal cases actually tried was 14,200 
(about one for every adult. The annual average for 
criminal and civil summonses and rent claims issued 
over the eight years 1922–29 was only a little lower 
(Powles 1990, 164).
31 Chief Justice Horne observed: ‘It is appalling to think 
that 1,178 people were sent to prison by magistrates 
last year for the non-payment of fines’ (Annual 
Report of Chief Justice, 1927). 
32 Representation in Courts Ordinance 1914, No.5.
33 NCPR Report 2006, 31 August.
34 CEC Interim Report 2009; CEC Final Report 2009.
35 For details of the amending legislation and a consol-
idation to 30/11/2010, see Appendix to Powles 2013.
36 Questions around providing advice for Pacific island 
heads of state are reviewed in Ghai and Cottrell 
1990, 102–104.
37 NCPR Report, 2006, Chapter 4. 
38 Tongan Prime Minister, Radio New Zealand 
International 19/2/2009.
39 Details of these clauses are cited in the summary of 
identified reforms in section 2 above.
40 A situation like this raises questions about how the 
Monarch should be advised in legal matters. Until 
repealed in 1990, clause 93 of the Constitution had 
required since 1875 that the judges give opinions on 
important matters to the King, Cabinet or Assembly 
if requested to do so. 
41 Act of Constitution of Tonga (Amendment) Act 2014, 
and Judicial and Legal Service Commission Act 2014, 
were passed by the Assembly on 28 August 2014 and 
in October were awaiting royal assent (Matangi Tonga 
9/10/2014). 
42  As to the likelihood that dealings with a member of 
the judiciary might be difficult, or perhaps involve a 
dispute threatening judicial independence, see Powles 
2013, 33–44.
43 Parliamentary Committee Starting Public Consulta-
tions. Matangi Tonga 18/11/2012.
44 A powerful plea for courage to stand up for what 
you believe to be right was made by former attorney-
general, Mrs ‘Alisi Taumoepeau, during her evidence 
to the inquiry into the loss of the ferry Princess Ashika 
(reported by Sean Dorney on ABC Radio National’s 
Correspondents Report 31/1/2010; Matangi Tonga 
2/2/2010). 
45 Matangi Tonga 9/6/2013.
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